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Abstract: This paper studies the process that led to the Argentine crisis. The crisis is understood as a major 
disappointment of previous expectations, indicated by widespread insolvencies and abrupt declines in 
consumption. The analysis concentrates on the sequence of public and private decisions, and the varying 
perceptions and policy incentives that motivated them. In the nineties Argentina searched for a new growth 
trend. During much of the period, the behavior of agents seemed to be based on the anticipation that current 
and future incomes could sustain a value of domestic spending much higher than in the past. The government 
was motivated to reinforce those expectations, for signaling and political economy reasons. The convertibility 
monetary regime not only provided a very visible nominal anchor, but also operated as a basic framework for 
financial contracts, mostly denominated in dollars. Dollar contracting implicitly presumed that the dollar 
value of incomes would support the servicing of debts. Despite precautionary measures, the reliance on the 
sustainability of the real exchange rate increased over time. In the late nineties exports stopped rising and the 
foreign supply of credit tightened. Facing these contraints, the economy contracted and the solvency of the 
government was put into question. The financial system was vulnerable both in the event of devaluation and 
that of a (large) deflation-cum-adjustment. As was implicit in its design and management, convertibility 
proved to have very large exit costs. 
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The Argentine experiment with a hard peg (convertibility) ended in a deep economic and political 
crisis. In this paper we study the process that led to that outcome. As other salient episodes, this one 
is generating an active quest for lessons of analytical or practical interest. This activity indicates that 
some useful knowledge is to be gained by studying the experience after the fact. Analysts and 
agents must then be engaged in learning, and hence cannot be presumed to know precisely (and, 
even more, to have known at the time) the features of the forces that drove the evolution of the 
economy. We concentrate on the sequence of public and private decisions, as resulted from the 
particular perceptions formed at each moment and from the specific setup of economic institutions 
and policy-making games. In this regard, the crisis appears as both an institutional breakdown and 
as an event that disappointed numerous expectations and beliefs.  
 
Two arguments are often encountered in the discussion of the Argentine case: that fiscal policies 
were inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate (implying that the political system was incapable of 
adjusting itself to the discipline of budget constraints and let the public debt grow along an 
explosive path), and that the convertibility regime was such that it induced an overvaluation of the 
currency, and thus was bound to end in a collapse. There are elements of validity in both arguments, 
but they are incomplete, and cannot provide by themselves the full picture. 
 
A government that declares default on its debt has obviously spent beyond its means. In retrospect, 
public expenditures (especially when measured in dollar terms) appear to have been excessive. 
However, the same holds for private spending. The persistence of fiscal deficits throughout a period 
of high domestic demand and real activity point to a lack of policy consistency, and indicates that 
fiscal policies did not take precautions against adverse disturbances. But, if the decade of the 
nineties appears now as a long cyclical phase of transitorily high real incomes, it does not seem to 
have been perceived as such as the time. Not only the government, but asset holders and the public 
in general acted during a good part of the decade as if the evolution of the economy (and the fiscal 
situation, in particular) need not cause big concerns. The Argentine government had quite fluid 
access to credit markets during most of the decade indicating that, although the scenario of default 
was always assigned a non-negligible probability, its occurrence was far from taken as a foregone 
conclusion. The behavior of private spending did not correspond to the picture of agents who 
recognized that the public sector was overextended and reacted in “Ricardian” anticipation of an 
adjustment to come. 
 
When the real exchange rate jumps as it did in Argentina at the start of 2002 (more than 150% in 
the lapse of few months) it may seem natural to conclude that the currency was overvalued. But it 
remains to be explained why the exchange rate was under no pressure for a good part of the whole 
decade, and why many agents appear to have acted during extended periods as if they believed that 
convertibility was a durable and robust framework for their decisions. In the early nineties, private 
consumption increased sharply, and remained high until the end of the decade. Investment also rose 
strongly, and much of it was destined to the production of non-traded goods. While expectations 
were probably quite heterogeneous, this pattern seems to correspond to a perception that the level of 
real income and the dollar price of domestic goods had risen permanently. 
 
In summary, a coherent explanation of the Argentine crisis should take into account the interaction 
between wealth perceptions and the decisions of government and private agents. The dynamics of 
both fiscal accounts and the real exchange rate have to be placed in the context of the expectations 
that domestic and foreign agents had about the future path of the economy. The policy reforms 
adopted during the nineties had a critical role in the formation of those expectations. Among them, 
the role of the monetary system of convertibility went much beyond its function as nominal anchor. 
  1In the nineties, Argentina searched for a new growth trend. Over time, more and more contractual 
promises were predicated on the presumption that the economy could sustain real growth under 
convertibility. In an economy still haunted by credibility problems, when faced with macro 
disturbances, the authorities responded by doubling the commitment to the fixed exchange rate, and 
implicitly supported the dollarization of contracts. The government promised that “one peso equals 
one dollar” and that its bonds would be punctually repaid in dollars; privatized utilities had their 
prices set in dollars, banks promised to return deposits in dollars, borrowers signed large volumes of 
promises denominated in dollars. Those commitments required that the economy could produce 
sufficient incomes in terms of dollars. The system could work well in an expansion, and showed the 
capacity to absorb quite large financial shocks. However, the seemingly unconditional promises 
were contingent on the realization of a good set of productivity effects, international conditions for 
exports, consistent fiscal policies and a willingness of foreign lenders to supply credit to an 
economy with growth prospects. A large shock to those expectations, as in fact took place, hit an 
economy which was unprepared to make a significant adjustment of the dollar value of spending 
and incomes without putting into question the whole contractual framework.  
 
The argument that large swings in aggregate spending and real activity can result from wealth 
misperceptions has been made in the past with reference to Latin American crises of the early 
eighties.
1 Wealth perceptions can change for different reasons. The value of income streams and the 
sustainable levels of spending may be modified by external shocks of “real” or financial nature (like 
the sudden stops in foreign financing due to idiosyncratic behavior of credit markets stressed by 
Calvo et al. (2002)) But, in an economy where the “fundamental” configuration of incentives and 
opportunities can change substantially over short periods, agents have a more general problem in 
projecting a growth trend in their incomes. This, we believe, was a relevant issue in the Argentine 
economy during the nineties. Here, agents could entertain the belief that an economy with 
considerable resources, after reforming its policies and solving such a major and long-standing 
problem as high inflation, would be able to allow its residents to have a much higher level of 
spending, on the basis of improved growth prospects. Moreover, the contractual system developed 
under convertibility was consistent with those beliefs, since the use of the dollar as a unit of 
denomination presumed that incomes could be maintained in terms of that unit. Nevertheless, it was 
vulnerable to macroeconomic contingencies such as large movements in the real exchange rate. On 
the way towards the end of convertibility, strong doubts developed about the solvency of large sets 
of agents. The collapse of the monetary regime was associated with a widespread breakdown of 
contracts, which included the destruction of the financial system, and not only the bankruptcy of the 
government.  
 
The relevance of the contractual setup in the Argentine case derives partially form the “original sin” 
of a government that issues debt in foreign currencies (Hausmann and Panizza (2002)), but it has a 
broader nature. Under convertibility, the dollarization of most financial transactions between private 
residents made the solvency of large groups of individuals contingent on the real exchange rate. 
This meant that the perceived exit costs of the fixed exchange rate were extremely high: it was this 
financial effect which induced such a strong “fear to float”, so that governments (of different 
parties) were so reluctant to abandon convertibility even when the economy was experiencing 
strong disturbances. The dollarization of contracts also was a major factor in the trauma that 
resulted in the actual exit from convertibility.  
 
                                                 
1 Barandarian (1988) and Heymann (1984) made the point, respectively, for the Chilean and Argentine 
episodes of the time.  
  22.  Wealth Perceptions and Economic Decisions 
 
In the eighties, Argentine residents had to cope with the inconveniences and costs brought about by 
price instability. One of its consequences (jointly with the debt overhang and the large budget 
deficits) was the very scarce supply of financing to the private sector, and the almost total absence 
of credit with maturities extending more than a few weeks. In hyperinflation, even everyday 
transactions were disrupted. This induced a receptive mood for large-scale reforms in economic 
policies. Such reforms did take place in the nineties, with convertibility as their centerpiece. The 
reforms and the renewed international willingness to supply credit represented a drastic change in 
the economic environment. This modified the prospects and opportunities of most agents, but in 
ways that were not easy to specify. The questions to be addressed in forming expectations were far 
from trivial: How strong would be the effects of price stabilization on productivity and investment? 
How would the economy respond to trade liberalization, privatization and changes in taxes and 
regulatory policies? What outside shocks may the economy be subject to, and what was their likely 
impact? What were the chances that convertibility would be maintained, and what were the 
conditions under which it would be abandoned? What would the economy be like in case of an exit 
from convertibility? Even in retrospect, it seems hard to specify well-defined assessments of the 
likelihood of different scenarios and their characteristics.  
 
It was quickly apparent that stabilization and reforms came together with a substantial increase in 
output and a real appreciation. Agents had to establish (implicitly or explicitly) how they viewed the 
expansion, in a range that could go between considering the recovery of real (and dollar-valued) 
incomes as a reversible cyclical episode, or treating it as the start of a trend of persistent growth. 
The gyrations of the Argentine economy in the past offered no definite “focal point” to guide 
expectations. At the same time, the mood of the times (both in the country and abroad) seemed to 
promote optimism about the potential aggregate effects of the reforms.
2 The expansionary 
expectations could be self-reinforcing for a while if agents interpreted positively the observed 
increases in output and aggregate demand (Heymann and Sanguinetti (1998, 2000)). In any case, 
the problem of defining and projecting “permanent incomes” was posed throughout the period; at 
some moments it seemed to fade in the background, and emerged prominently in times of crisis. 
Indeed, the identification of trends in Argentina has been traditionally difficult, and particularly so 
during the nineties (cf. Kydland and Zarazaga (2002)).  
 
The dollar value of GDP had very large oscillations in Argentina. Over the lapse of about three 
decades, the data seem clustered in distinct sets (see the phase diagram in Figure 1), with a group of 
points corresponding to the seventies and eighties, a short but highly visible “excursion” (up to a 
maximum above U$S 15000) around 1980, and a quite tight set of observations for the 
convertibility period. Standard (H-P) trends calculated with data up to the late nineties and early 
2000’s (while they coincide in their sharp contrasts with respect to the estimate made, say, in 1989) 
point to quite different descriptions of the behavior during convertibility: the line with observations 
until 1998 trend describes a series with a sizeable growth; the line built with data covering up to 
2000 would suggest a gradual convergence to a new level, while the inclusion of the sharply lower 
observation of 2002 shows a cycle in the nineties, with all the points during convertibility being 
located well above the trend line. 
 
 
<Figure 1> 
                                                 
2 The prevailing views of the time are well reflected by Lora and Barrera (1997), who estimate that reforms in 
Latin America had a permanent effect on growth of around 2%. Lora and Panizza (2002), review those 
estimates with updated information, and find a much more modest impact. 
  3The performance of the dollar value of GDP is relevant as a measure of the levels of spending 
power that agents may have incorporated in their decisions. The dollar value of incomes is of course 
a critical variable in determining the capacity to serve dollar-denominated debts. Also, in a simple 
intertemporal model of a small open economy with traded and non-traded goods, the current 
consumption demand of both goods and the desired capital stock in the production of non-traded 
goods depend on the perceived level of wealth. Since the real exchange rate is endogenously 
determined, that price and the demand for consumption and investment are functions of the current 
and anticipated supply conditions of the goods, the evolution of fiscal policies, and the world 
interest rate, as incorporated into those wealth perceptions. Given that the non-tradable component 
of income of the representative agent has its value determined by the value of spending, the present 
value of the output of traded goods (the “tradable component” of wealth) will have a crucial role in 
the system, particularly in the determination of the sustainable levels of the consumption of tradable 
goods and the real exchange rate (see Appendix 1). 
 
In such a framework, a configuration characterized by a sharp increase in consumption, a real 
appreciation and a rise in investment, particularly directed towards the future production of non-
traded goods (Ramos and Martinez (2000)) a real appreciation and a current account deficit, would 
quite naturally be interpreted as an outcome of the perception of a permanent upward shift in the 
value of income in terms of traded goods, supported by the expectation of a future growth in the 
supply of tradables.
3 Clearly, this elementary model is too simple to give more than suggestive 
results, but the picture seems reasonably defined: the qualitative features of the Argentine economy 
during the early nineties look like outcomes of behavior relying on the anticipation of future 
productivity effects (which would particularly touch tradable sectors, and generate output growth at 
a lower real exchange rate), and a fluid supply of foreign credit in the transition. It was as if the 
expectation of a new growth trend was discounted in the decisions of both private agents and the 
government, and led to a jump in the dollar value of domestic spending. In order to sustain those 
decisions, the dollar value of incomes had to be sufficient to maintain spending and to service debts, 
and that required that a sufficient growth in the output of tradables did materialize before the supply 
of credit dried up. 
 
While on aggregate the economy was generating positive signals in terms of price stabilization and 
output growth, there were also important potential sources of uncertainty, given the possibility of 
outside shocks on trade or financing, and the risk that productivity in traded-goods would not grow 
sufficiently to validate the levels of spending in dollar terms that had already been attained. Such 
uncertainties were shared in principle by the government and by private agents, while the latter had 
to consider also the chance that fiscal policies would not behave consistently. These were motives 
for precautionary behavior, on the part of spenders and lenders (who had reason to weigh 
particularly the expected performance in “bad states”, where repayment was likely to become 
problematic). Agents did in fact make clear distinctions between peso and dollar assets; and the 
attitudes of voters and politicians showed much dislike for the perspective of a devaluation, 
indicating that they judged that an exit from convertibility would bring large economic losses. 
Agents did take actions that provided for the case of shocks. Especially after the experience of the 
financial disturbance triggered by the Mexican depreciation in late 1994, prudential regulations and 
the government’s debt management established buffers against swings in the supply of credit that 
may affect liquidity. The net foreign asset position of the private sector declined, especially due to 
FDI operations, but private residents accumulated financial assets abroad. However, on the whole, 
the spending and savings decisions, of the government and the private sector did not reveal much 
concern for getting “insurance” against the chance that aggregate demand and the prices of non-
                                                 
3 Other impulses would generate some of the qualitative outcomes in the simple model, but would not fit as 
easily that configuration (see Heymann (1994)).  
  4tradables had risen too much and may have to adjust sharply downwards at some point. Although 
the observation is conjectural, it would seem that, once the real exchange rate and the volume of 
output had reached points such that the dollar value of GDP attained its “typical” size of the nineties 
(about U$S 8000 per capita), most agents viewed that as a “permanent” level, subject to fluctuations 
but not to catastrophic declines.
4  
 
Between 1990 and 1994, private consumption rose well over 35% in real terms (and its dollar value 
practically doubled). In the recovery after the 1995 recession, once again consumption increased 
rapidly, and declined steeply after 1998, so that by 2002 it had fallen to the levels of the early 
nineties (see Figure 2), The wide swings in the real assets (which seem to have found many people 
unprepared) and the large ups and downs in the consumption of large groups of individuals are 
hardly reconcilable with decisions made under foresight: they invalidated widely held beliefs.  
 
<Figure 2> 
 
3.  Fiscal Policy and Politics 
 
Budget imbalances have been stressed as major factors of the Argentine crisis (see Mussa, 2002). 
Indeed, various aspects of fiscal policies were central to the economic and political dynamics in the 
period of convertibility.  Both changing perceptions and the political and institutional details 
underlying the policymaking process were relevant for fiscal behavior. In the end, the outcome was 
quite negative: the country could neither enjoy the benefits of countercyclical policies, nor did it 
gain the reputation for fiscal soundness which could have improved the perceptions of sustainability 
at key times. 
 
The introduction of convertibility and various policy reforms did introduce some fundamental 
changes in the public sector. The relationship of the central government to public enterprises, which 
had been a source of soft budget constraints, was fundamentally altered by privatization, which also 
provided an important source of funding at some points in the decade. The tight monetary rule had 
among its main purposes that of forcing the government to do without the inflation tax. In fact, the 
fiscal deficit was noticeably lower than in the previous decades.   
 
<Figure 3> 
 
However, with the possibility of accessing bond markets (after a long period of completely 
restricted financing), and lacking sizeable seignorage revenues, the government had to deal with its 
budget constraint in quite different ways than in the past. Instead of focusing on day-to-day 
management, fiscal decisions came to be predicated on longer-term prospects, as viewed by the 
authorities and financial operators. Fluctuations in economic activity created trade-offs between 
trying to apply standard countercyclical measures and adopting tighter policies in order to ease 
tensions in credit markets. At the same time, the unavailability of monetary and exchange rate 
                                                 
4 In this regard, the variability of the GDP in dollar (per capita) terms in Argentina during the period of 
convertibility was substantially lower than that of other “emerging economies”, in Latin America and Asia. 
This was associated, of course, to the constancy of the exchange rate with the dollar but, in any case, it meant 
that if the estimation of permanent incomes had some “adaptive” element, the evidence would have tended to 
confirm the belief that the observed values were not far from normal. It is clear that a small variability (actual 
and expected) of dollar incomes was functional with a dollarized financial system. However, there remained 
the fundamental question of whether that small variability was compatible with the required adjustments to 
the shocks acting on the economy.  
  5policy instruments imposed new demands upon fiscal policies, concerning competitiveness and the 
generation of employment. 
 
Varying beliefs about the prospects of the economy influenced decisions over time. The large 
increase in government spending in the early nineties probably responded to a view by the 
authorities that, overall, the growth in revenues was well supported by a trend in economic activity 
and a sustainable rise in non-traded goods prices, all of which would allow the issuing of debt to 
instrument previously unrecognized liabilities (as those with pensioners) and the transfer of social 
security contributions to private funds through the pension reform. In addition, the government may 
have wished to signal that it had strong confidence in the success of its policies, in order to induce 
the private sector to react to the growth opportunities that the authorities perceived existed in the 
economy (see Appendix 2). 
 
In the second part of the nineties, while the public debt kept rising (in part, due to successive 
reductions in social security taxes, as unemployment became a prominent issue), primary spending 
increased in absolute terms but, as long as real activity expanded, it declined as a proportion of 
GDP, and the evolution of public finances was not a big cause of alarm for the government. Fiscal 
adjustment only became an everyday concern when the economy had been already in recession for 
some time and the creditworthiness of the government had come under question. At this point, 
cutting public expenditures (or raising taxes, for that matter) had to overcome the resistance of a 
population increasingly worried about unemployment, income inequalities and political corruption. 
The perception that the economy had reached a critical state could perhaps induce the public to 
resign itself to adjustments, but it did not help in fostering expectations of an improved fiscal 
position. This tension was one of the features of the last phase of the crisis. 
  
During the period of convertibility, the public sector accumulated deficits, although these were not 
particularly large as proportion of GDP until revenues collapsed. However, the government had 
established a level of spending and had issued bonds denominated in dollars so that its solvency 
required a continued increase in the dollar value of receipts, anticipated by financial operators (so as 
to induce lending at moderate rates.) A growing economy may have provided sustainability for a 
prudent fiscal policy. But no “insurance” (either in the form of surpluses in the expansion or in the 
denomination of debts) had been taken against the chance that the dollar value of incomes and tax 
revenues would fall considerably (and, possibly, trigger the realization of contingent liabilities 
originating in the financial system, if the solvency of private debtors was also impaired). When this 
danger was present, decreasing receipts and much higher interest rates compounded the fiscal 
problem, until devaluation and default finally made insolvency explicit. 
 
The end of convertibility was a dramatic episode of a history of economic and political instability. 
Price stabilization allowed implementing budgeting practices as was impossible under high 
inflation. However, problems in the functioning of the political system continued to influence the 
design and the implementation of policies. Traditionally, the Argentine polity has been unable to 
strike the intertemporal political agreements that are necessary to instrument effective public 
policies in a cooperative manner (Spiller and Tommasi, 2001). Key actors (corporatist, partisan, 
institutional) have tended to behave opportunistically and non-cooperatively when dealing with one 
another. Areas such as the federal fiscal system revealed in a particularly salient way the non-
cooperative nature of interactions and the inability to sustain political agreements. This generated 
policy inconsistencies and variability
5. Conversely, the often large changes in economic conditions 
created frequent and tough dilemmas to policies, and led to sudden reversals in “critical” instances. 
                                                 
5 Spiller and Tommasi (2001) document policy volatility in Argentina.; in an index of macroeconomic policy 
volatility, the country occupies the seventh highest rank in a sample of 106. 
  6In such a context, political actors tended to behave myopically, with sporadic attempts at containing 
instability by adopting rigid policy mechanisms. The breakdown of such attempts was an important 
element in determining the intensity of policy cycles. In Argentina, neither discretion nor policy 
rigidity proved successful. 
 
The lack of sustainable compromises among the key politico–institutional actors hindered the 
development of credible alternatives to the rigid monetary regime of the currency board. Judicial, 
fiscal, monetary or other institutions that may have alleviated the exchange rate-regime from 
assuming the burden of providing support to the contractual system were clearly not present at the 
beginning, and were not developed over time. Even though attempts were made to establish some 
fiscal procedures, some federal agreements, some monetary institutions, and to improve the 
workings of the judicial system, all of that proved to be ink on paper when put to the test: fiscal 
responsibility laws, fiscal pacts, central bank independence, deposit guarantees, were ignored at 
crucial times. In turn, this was determined in part by the absence of monetary instruments for the 
purposes of dealing with shocks, which indirectly burdened other policies: the drastic changes in the 
economic performance put legislative agreements under strong stress. Once more, economic 
instability and broken “policy promises” reinforced one another in an explosive spiral.  
 
The shortcomings of the policy decision processes (which often relied on the personal influence of 
particular individuals in the government) became salient at particular moments such as the crisis of 
2001/2002. While the crisis would have been extremely difficult to handle in any case, the relevant 
actors (including international agents like the IMF) were unable to establish a precise policy course. 
At the same time, the urgent problems which emerged in rapid succession frequently led executive 
authorities to take measures of the greater importance “on the spot” (sometimes through 
“emergency decrees”), without going through a process of detailed discussion and legislative 
decision, which they judged unacceptably slow and uncertain. On its side, Parliament voted laws 
that questioned central elements of economic policies, and menaced to create unsolvable dilemmas. 
The Judiciary branch (itself without a reputation for impartiality) often reversed government 
decisions. The outcome was that policies did not follow a definite direction, while being perceived 
as arbitrary and lacking legitimacy, causing further damage in an already difficult situation. 
 
4.  Maintaining and Managing Convertibility: Policy Choices 
 
Convertibility lasted for over ten years, a very long period for the standards of Argentine 
policymaking. Its collapse was associated with one of the deepest economic crises in the country’s 
history. Both these characteristics of the regime deserve attention. They were linked to the high exit 
costs of the system, which made it robust in the event of not-too-large shocks and, at the same time 
implied that, if and when the regime was abandoned, it had to be in a very traumatic way and in 
circumstances where the economy was subject to a very strong disturbance. The dramatic end of 
convertibility was in correspondence with the high exit costs that were determined by initial design 
and by the dynamics of economic and policy choices throughout the decade. 
 
In order to analyze the dynamics of policy choices during the period of convertibility, it seems 
useful to refer to a stylized decision tree that characterizes in a very schematic manner the decision 
faced by Argentine policymakers at key nodes after the introduction of the regime. 
 
  7Figure 4: Schematic policy decision tree under Convertibility 
 
    E X I T  
   
                  BUY SOME INSURANCE 
       
    STAY 
 
                  DOUBLE THE BET 
 
On several occasions, the option of exiting convertibility was on the table, recommended by some 
(mostly foreign) analysts, and feared by economic agents in the country. Given a choice of not 
exiting convertibility, in turn, complementary policy measures could be geared towards providing 
some insurance against the worst possible scenarios (or allowing some room for “exit clauses” in 
the event of shocks), or alternatively, they could attempt to signal an even stronger commitment (by 
raising exit costs).
6 The upper branches of the tree would be associated with precautionary behavior, 
while the lower ones would be riskier ones that opted for signaling “toughness” in maintaining the 
monetary rule. Even though measures to buffer the economy against some bad states (originating in 
financial shocks) were indeed adopted by strengthening prudential regulations on banks, especially 
after the Mexican crisis, on the whole, most of the policy choices made throughout the decade took 
the “lower branch” of the tree, and contributed to raise the difficulty of abandoning the fixed 
exchange rate. These measures had an effect on expectations; however, in the end it became clear 
that the state of the economy, and not only perceptions the government’s “type” condition 
credibility (see Drazen and Masson, 1994; Drazen, 2000).    
 
The costs of leaving convertibility, a summary of a very complex tree opening up in case of exit, are 
a key “state variable” in the analysis. Those costs were not simply determined by the institutional 
design of the monetary system, since they depended on the evolution of policy decisions and the 
behavior of private agents, particularly regarding the denomination of contracts. However, it may be 
useful to consider what criteria may have determined the selection of the size of initial exit costs (as 
in the models of rules with escape clauses à la Flood and Isard, 1989). It is a standard result that the 
desired exit cost would vary positively with the magnitude of the (time-inconsistency) distortion 
which provides the motivation for imposing the rule, and negatively with the typical intensity of the 
shocks which may hit the economy and call for flexibility of the variable that the rule fixed (here, 
the exchange rate). In the Argentine case, the costs of discretion were very salient, but in 1991 the 
perception of potential shocks was probably not as vivid; also, the benefits of a tight rule were 
likely to be realized soon, while the potential risks were more of a medium-term nature. These 
considerations may have weighed toward the adoption of a tight rule. 
  
After convertibility was launched, private agents had to find out how the economy would function 
under new conditions; the same applied to policymakers, who had incentives to behave strategically 
in order to influence the beliefs of the public. In this respect, reinforcing the commitment to the 
fixed exchange rate could be seen as a signal that the authorities had strong confidence in their 
policies. Also, having introduced a tight rule, “option value” arguments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
  8
                                                 
6 In this context, the dollarization proposals would count as particularly strong forms of raising the bet, by 
exiting convertibility “in the other direction”.  may have implicitly influenced decisions, since exit was clearly an irreversible action. In the event 
of a shock, sticking to the system left open the chance of managing the disturbance without a policy 
reversal, with definite benefits for the government. 
 
The arguments presented so far would apply even if policy was decided by (imperfectly informed) 
benevolent planners. But the asymmetric information policy games observed in Argentina were at 
times (and still are) much more deeply political, with politicians trying to convey messages about 
the connection between policies and outcomes in order to affect people’s beliefs about their 
competence and intentions. At some key moments, such as the 1995 and 1999 electoral campaigns, 
those considerations (and their interactions with citizens’ beliefs) also tilted the balance towards the 
narrow corridor of an all-or-nothing bet on convertibility. 
 
5.  Events and decisions 
 
a.  The entry node   
 
In 1989 and 1990, price instability reached extreme proportions in several bursts of hyperinflation. 
Hyperinflation gave saliency to the costs that monetary discretion and the use and abuse of the 
inflation tax had imposed on the economy. Price stabilization was perceived (by the government 
and by the public) as a basic priority. The painful and fragile disinflation of 1990, under a dirty float 
(when prices kept rising rapidly, with high interest rates and a depressed real activity) had created a 
demand for a more direct and effective move towards stabilization, especially when a sudden surge 
in the demand for foreign exchange had once again induced a large depreciation of the domestic 
currency and a rise in inflation rates in the first months of 1991. In this context, the authorities 
choose to establish a tight peg to the dollar with full convertibility at the start of April 1991. 
 
Fixing the exchange rate implies well-known policy dilemmas (see, for example, Calvo and Vegh 
1993, and Guidotti and Vegh, 1999). The commitment to an exchange rate fixing can vary by 
degrees: it can range from a de facto peg hardly distinguishable from a very dirty float to an 
institutional provision completely depriving policy managers of discretion. The authorities have to 
decide whether to fix the exchange rate ‘for the time being’ or to commit themselves to enforce a 
pre-set parity indefinitely. Pegging as a transitory measure causes “peso problems” (Krasker, 1980), 
as expectations incorporate the chance that the anchor may be lifted even with a “moderate” 
disturbance. An indefinite promise of enforcing a hard peg, on the other hand, trusts that inflation 
will come down to international levels soon enough and that the real exchange rate will remain at a 
value that proves sustainable.  
 
On balance, the incentives and perceptions of the Argentine government in 1991 weighed strongly 
on the side of defining a tight rule. However, it was conceivable that the convertibility system may 
have been used as a transitory instrument to stabilize prices, and replaced after a few years, either 
because economic policies had gained strength and reputation allowing a move to a more flexible 
system without losing control over inflation, or because of a shock. Neither one occurred. 
Confidence in policy-making capacities did not develop much, if at all; rather, it was the persistence 
of convertibility which, serving as a “fixed point” within the set of policies, made up for the low 
reputation of the policymaking system. Thus, instead of diminishing, the importance of 
convertibility as a basic economic institution grew over time.  
 
In any event, the authorities introduced the new system as a major reform in economic institutions, 
such that in practice there would be no more discretion in monetary matters and that the central 
bank would definitely stop offering credit to the government. The announcement of the rule did act 
as a definite signal for private agents, and induced rapid reactions. However, beyond the fact that 
  9convertibility was established by a parliamentary act (as was some time later the norm which 
reformed the Central Bank charter and gave it independence from the Executive), and required 
another law to be modified, it remained to be learned to what extent the system was meant to be 
durable, that is, what circumstances would trigger an “escape clause”, and how probable those 
circumstances were (Fanelli and Heymann, 2002). 
 
b.  The boom years: doubling the bet  
  
Overall, the public responded strongly to the change in monetary policies, in a way that revealed 
(particularly in the willingness to supply and demand credit) a considerable change in expectations 
about the economy’s real performance. Private spending and real output rose rapidly. However, it 
was unclear whether the observed evolution indicated a cyclical recovery or the start of a trend. In 
this regard, the government attributed much importance to the conditions that would stimulate 
investment.
7 Clearly, a fluid supply of credit was one of them. Given the experience of recent years, 
there could be reasonable doubts about the possibility of developing soon a thick financial market 
with contracts denominated in domestic units (even more so when the convertibility law had banned 
formal indexing). Thus, it was quite natural to perceive that either the economy would have a 
dollarized financial system, or credit would remain restricted. In this setting, the tradeoff could be 
identified as risky growth (to the extent that it was recognized that the dollar value of incomes was 
subject to the possibility of large unexpected movements) or slow growth. In the event, the 
authorities viewed the increase in the volume of dollar deposits and loans as a very important mean 
to mobilize resources (and, particularly, foreign currency balances hoarded by residents in periods 
of instability) for investment purposes, and they did not show much concern for the possibility of 
mismatches between commitments and repayment capacities. This seemed consistent with an 
attitude of trying to induce decisions that would generate economic growth, while leaving as a 
secondary consideration the search for “insurance” against negative shocks (see Appendix 2). 
 
As the trade balance rapidly switched from a large surplus to a deficit and domestic prices rose 
relative to the exchange rate, the future of convertibility was a matter of discussion, also in 
government circles.
8 This generated uncertainty among asset holders. Also, by mid 1992, the 
extraordinary boom in stock prices (which had multiplied by around a factor of three in a few 
months) was sharply reversed by large falls. The growth in real activity decelerated noticeably (but 
transitorily) in the second half of that year. Meanwhile, financial markets showed signs of doubts 
about the fixed exchange rate: interest rates went up, the increase in peso deposits was interrupted, 
while dollar deposits kept rising and foreign reserves stopped growing (with an actual fall in a short 
episode in November). This behavior did not amount to a full-scale attack, but it did pose in a 
concrete way the question of whether convertibility was to be considered as a more or less 
permanent system or as a transitory instrument for disinflation. In the event, the government chose 
to signal a firm commitment to the fixed exchange rate, through financial measures which, although 
not too strong by themselves, managed to convey quite clearly the message that, when tested, the 
policy response was to stress the credibility of the monetary rule and the currency’s definite link to 
                                                 
7 The 1992 annual report of the Ministry of the Economy stated: “The productive recovery was driven by… 
consumption and an increased availability of credit… The growth observed in 1991 and 1992 may be the 
beginning of the country’s economic takeoff. But several decades of stagnation have deteriorated the 
productive infrastructure. In those conditions, investment is the basic tool for growth” (Ministerio de 
Economía, 1992, pg. 2) 
8 The possibility of replacing (at some undefined moment) the fixed exchange rate with the dollar with a peg 
to a basket of currencies was mentioned by the finance minister in an academic meeting.  
  10the dollar.
9 Here and latter, when the robustness of convertibility was questioned, the authorities 
chose to double the bet on convertibility. 
 
Once the government made clear that it remained strongly committed to maintain the parity of the 
peso with the dollar, the question, at least in retrospect, was how to build precautions against the 
event of a significant increase in the sustainable real exchange rate. This required that the 
government could be perceived as solvent even in the very bad states of the world (Keynes, 1924).   
 
The fiscal situation changed rapidly as a result of policy measures and macroeconomic 
developments. The government showed much concern with raising tax collection, and revenues did 
rise sharply. Nevertheless, the government’s primary expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased 
noticeably during the first part of decade (see Figure 5). This increase had both price and quantity 
components. Price effects were important, as the implicit deflator of public consumption rose much 
more than the GDP deflator. Using these indices as the deflators for the corresponding nominal 
variables, primary spending shows a smaller growth than GDP (see Figure 6). This negative “terms 
of trade” effect for the public sector had a macroeconomic element, given the real appreciation and 
the increase in real wages; throughout the economy; another factor that increased the unitary price 
of public spending was the adjustment in the value of pensions to make them conform to the 
legislated amounts.  
 
<Figure 5>  
 
<Figure 6> 
 
The reform of the social security system (sanctioned in 1993 and implemented in 1994) had big 
effects over time. It created a dual system for the personal contributions of active workers, who 
could opt to remain in the public segment (although were induced not to do so, especially the 
young) or move to the newly created segment operated by pension funds under a funded system. 
The government would still collect payroll taxes from employers; it remained responsible for the 
payment of existing pensions, and was committed to complement the pensions of future retirees in 
the pension fund segment. A related measure increased the retirement age. One of the objectives of 
the new system was to channel long run financing to the private sector. However, in order to 
generate an aggregate change in the allocation of credit, the government had to allow the crowding-
in effect by absorbing at least part of the drop in revenues which would now go to the pension funds 
(representing an order of magnitude of 1.5% of GDP) without raising its borrowing requirements. 
For this, the authorities counted on positive effects on the government’s social security receipts 
from stronger incentives to contribute and from economic growth itself. To the extent that the 
implementation of the new system proved feasible over time, the public sector was reducing future 
liabilities; however, these liabilities under the old regime were not contractually binding in definite 
amounts, while the bonds that the government would now sell to “finance the transition” 
represented (mostly dollar denominated) fixed commitments (see Hausmann and Velasco, 2002). In 
this sense, the reform hardened the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, and made it even 
more dependent on the evolution of the real exchange rate. This was certainly at odds with the 
needs of “insurance” of the convertibility system. 
 
The fiscal performance of the period showed a sharp reduction in budget deficits compared with 
previous years. The authorities did not perceive the rapid increase in tax revenues and in the value 
                                                 
9 Other policies adopted in the first years of convertibility also tended to reinforce dollarization. For example, 
the government renegotiated price-setting regulatory schemes with privatized companies, replacing a CPI-
based price cap with one denominated in dollars and adjustable with the US price level. 
  11of primary spending as cyclical effects; rather, in their statements and in their behavior, they 
indicated their anticipation that growth would continue at a fast pace. In any case, during the 
expansion, both the public sector and private agents made decisions which implied strong bets on 
the sustainability of the real exchange rate and on a rising trend in real output, while narrowing their 
options for the case that future performance would not fulfill those expectations. 
 
c.  Surviving Tequila under convertibility  
 
With lower tax receipts after the pension system reform, and a substantial current account deficit, 
the economy had become more vulnerable to shocks. It was affected by the increase in rates of 
interest in the US and, by the end of 1994 it suffered a large financial disturbance after the Mexican 
devaluation. That event triggered a sharp fall in the price of Argentine bonds, a marked drop in 
Central Bank reserves and withdrawals of deposits from the banks that soon reached the intensity of 
a run. At the same time, the convertibility system greatly restricted the possibilities of applying 
monetary policies for lender of last resort purposes, and it denied the use of the exchange rate to 
accommodate the excess demand for foreign currencies. In these conditions, the central question 
was whether the government was willing and able to sustain convertibility. 
 
A financial shock induced by an outside event may have been taken as a chance of replacing the 
fixed exchange rate system without too much reputational loss. However, there were also strong 
incentives not to exit, particularly as the government had been raising the stakes of the game in such 
a way that it stood to face large costs if it abandoned convertibility, and correspondingly high 
payoffs if the crisis could be managed without giving it up. The public (and financial operators) 
understood that the crisis had an external origin, but they also understood that the shock would test 
the strength or weakness of the economy, and the behavior of a polity still haunted by severe 
credibility problems. It was likely that ending convertibility would have signaled that the economy 
was weak and that the “stabilization game” was over, with the possibility of inducing a wave of 
pessimism symmetric with the boost to expectations that the start of the program had generated. 
Conversely, the government saw that convertibility would have passed a big test of strength if it 
survived the shock, which would greatly enhance its credibility (as in fact it did). Also, the fresh 
memory of high inflation and, especially, the large number of people who had contracted dollar 
debts created a very strong constituency against devaluation.
10 Indeed, the incumbent authorities 
used as their main electoral argument that they were the ones who had ended hyperinflation and that 
they constituted the only political force that would maintain convertibility (Starr, 1999). The 
strategy worked, and led to the re-election of President Menem by a large margin.  
 
In any case, the shock posed urgent economic dilemmas. The government stuck to the tight 
exchange rate rule, and signaled strongly its commitment to it, but operated actively with a variety 
of instruments (including some aspects of monetary policy). Domestic policies received a crucial 
backing with a large and rapidly decided package of multilateral credits. The very important 
provision of funds at a moment when the future of the financial system was very much in doubt, 
and the announcement effect of the international assistance were probably essential for the 
favorable resolution of the crisis (Ganapolsky and Schmuckler, 1998). In addition, international 
conditions favored the rapid increase in exports, and continued to do so after the financial shock had 
passed.  
 
                                                 
10 A survey made by Centro de Estudios por una Nueva Mayoría in March 1995 (as the financial crisis was in 
an acute phase) gave the following answers to the question whether Argentina should devalue: No (80%), Yes 
(5%), Don’t Know (15%).  
  12As the government had expected, convertibility came out with a stronger reputation from the shock. 
The experience added to the credibility of the system as a stabilization device, the perception that it 
could stand even strong shocks if only political firmness was applied in defending the system. This 
increased again exit costs, which became even higher later on as the volume of dollarized financial 
contracts kept growing. 
 
The 1995 episode was driven by a financial shock, in a good external environment for exports. The 
main lessons that were drawn from it were of a financial nature. Regarding the government’s debt 
management, the government actively moved to lengthen maturities and to issue bonds in advance 
to the requirements of funds. Financial regulations raised the capital and liquidity requirements of 
banks. The Central Bank negotiated a contingent credit line from international banks, with the 
purpose of reinforcing its availability of resources in the event of a shock. These policies were 
precautions against liquidity problems: they were aimed at creating buffers to be used in case of 
sudden tightening of the international supply of credit or extemporaneous reductions in the demand 
for bank deposits. They worked to that effect during the long contractionary phase which started in 
1998, until this came to be perceived as a widespread solvency crisis: at this point, financial markets 
operated as large amplifiers of the disturbance.   
 
Meanwhile, the recovery from the 1995 shock and recession led to a phase of renewed optimism 
about the economy’s growth capacity, although the persistence of high unemployment and the 
widening of income inequalities were matters of public concern (in fact, by the late 1990’s, only the 
households in the highest brackets of the distribution had real per capita incomes higher than at 
mid-1994). This aggregate expansion had different characteristics than the one of the early nineties. 
Internal prices practically stopped rising and, in fact, the bilateral real exchange rate with the dollar 
gradually increased. Exports (mostly, their quantity) rose very fast, especially (but not only) to 
Brazil. Investment in machinery and equipment also increased rapidly. The current account deficit 
was widely interpreted as an element of the growth process. International investors joined actively 
in the optimistic mood, not only by increasing their demand for Argentine bonds, but also through 
the large flows of FDI which entered the country in those years, into a wide range of sectors 
(services, finance, manufacturing, primary activities.) The government did not seem worried about 
the evolution of the economy, especially when the Asian crisis of 1997 did not produce very 
noticeable effects, apart from a short impact on financial markets.
11 
 
However, by the end of the expansion in 1998, the debts of the government and the private sector 
were quite higher than some years before. The question of how to manage decisions so as to avoid a 
solvency problem was already there. Increasing tax revenues had to come mainly from growth in 
output, which could not be based on persistently large current account deficits, and therefore 
required a strong upward trend in exports. In these circumstances, the shocks on exports (lower 
prices, reduced demand from Brazil, an appreciated dollar) touched the economy at a particularly 
vulnerable point. If the expectation that exports were to continue growing could not be maintained, 
sustainability of the dollar value of incomes would come into doubt, and with it, the ability of the 
government to service its mostly dollar-denominated debts; ultimately, the strength of the financial 
system itself would become endangered. There was a visible tension between fiscal and external 
                                                 
11 “The solidity of the fundamentals of the Argentine economy, and the policies which were carried out, 
including the reforms introduced since 1995 to strengthen the financial system, encapsulated the effects of the 
crisis exclusively in capital markets…. In the financial system, the volume of deposits and loans kept 
increasing, and the most negative consequences were transitory increases in interest rates, a light fall in peso 
deposits and a transitory drop in international reserves. The uncertainty in financial markets was not 
transmitted to the real economy, since production and investment continued to rise” (Ministerio the 
Economía, 1997, p. 7).  
  13adjustments.
12 This tension, in an economy that had been growing rapidly but where unemployment 
had remained very high, caused increasingly difficult dilemmas in the following years. 
 
d.  Recession and collapse: no way out 
 
 By the end of 1998, unit export prices were 20% lower than at their peaks about two years earlier, 
and had gone back to the levels of the first part of the decade
13. The demand from Brazil had 
stagnated, and the process that led to the depreciation of the Real in early 1999 was under way. The 
economy was receiving a substantial real shock that contributed to the stagnation in the value of 
exports in the following years (see Figure 7). At the same time, the Russian debt crisis had a strong 
effect on Argentina credit markets; after the tension eased somewhat, the Brazilian devaluation in 
early 1999 induced another steep rise in the yield on Argentine bonds.  
 
<Figure 7> 
 
The government reacted to the financial shocks by trying to “differentiate” the economy from those 
of the countries in crisis, and insisting on the strength of the fiscal and financial positions. This 
aimed at providing reassurances to financial operators, hoping to reduce the level of “country risk”. 
In this context, proposals to dollarize were widely discussed: the arguments to that effect pointed 
out that there was a correlation between sovereign debt spread and the peso-dollar interest rate 
differentials, and tried to infer that devaluation risk drove those changes. In that view, the problem 
with the monetary system was the persistence of an implicit exit clause, not insufficient flexibility 
to respond to real shocks: the appropriate action was to signal that there were additional institutional 
guarantees against policymakers with misguided opinions or biased incentives trying to tamper with 
monetary policies. But dollarization did not find significant international support and, in any case, it 
could not restore export growth or solve the fiscal problems if the economy stagnated or went into a 
more serious recession for more fundamental economic reasons than fear of an “arbitrary” policy 
reversal. 
 
The basic issue remained the probable evolution of prospects of the value of aggregate output and 
incomes in terms of the dollar (as the main denominator of contracts). Those prospects depended 
indeed on fiscal prudence, through its influence on interest rates, but relied especially on the 
behavior of exports and traded-goods production in general. A sufficiently strong performance of 
exports could allow maintaining the current account and the fiscal balance within manageable 
bounds at levels of real activity and prices which (although probably lower than the trends projected 
some time before) would not cause much stress on the repayment of debts. Otherwise, there was a 
risk of a spiral of adjustments in private and public spending (see Appendix 1) which, quite apart 
from the matter of price flexibility, could result in a debt deflation process that may eventually 
endanger the financial system and convertibility itself.  
 
Even though the shocks on trade, if persistent, increased the sustainable real exchange rate, a 
preventive devaluation (against a “worst case” crisis scenario) was not a concrete policy option, 
                                                 
12 Elementary “arithmetical” exercises for the accounts of the national government and the balance of 
payments starting from actual data for 1998, suggest that a feasible path satisfying external and fiscal 
constraints required (in addition to fiscal restraint and sufficient supply of credit), a considerable increase in 
exports and, possibly, a substantial slowdown for some time in aggregate domestic spending, but within limits 
that would avoid causing too much pressure on public finances. 
13 It should be noted here that, in an economy with dollarized debts, a “neutral deflation” of export and import 
prices (i.e. one which does not modify the terms of trade) can have strong real effects, since it reduces the 
equilibrium price level in dollar terms and, therefore, it causes a fall in the wealth of debtors relative to their 
liabilities. 
  14since it meant breaking a highly valued policy commitment, and facing agonizing choices on how to 
handle dollar-denominated contracts. In fact, during the Presidential campaign of 1999, the 
maintenance of convertibility was once again one of the principal electoral arguments. Public 
opinion seemed to demand clear changes in political mores and more attention to unemployment 
and social issues, but suggestions that the exchange rate system could be put under question caused 
fear and visible opposition.
14  
 
Fiscal policies (probably influenced by electoral considerations) appeared to operate as if there was 
no urgent need for adjustment. In 1999, primary spending rose in absolute terms (at the national 
level and in the provinces), and sharply as a fraction of GDP. The authorities implemented some 
expansionary measures, like a subsidy scheme to stimulate purchases of new cars. Fiscal revenues 
declined: once again, lower social security taxes were an important factor (in part, due to reductions 
in rates). The consolidated budget deficit jumped to 3% of GDP (or almost 4% without considering 
privatization revenues).  
 
By the end of 1999, real output and consumption showed a rebound, and the possibility that the 
recession had ended received much attention. However, the deficit in the current account indicated 
that there could be a tight constraint for a recovery without a renewed increase in exports, while 
government finances looked far from balanced. Both the general public and financial operators 
waited for signals from the government that was taking office in December 1999. The “markets” 
seemed to demand fiscal measures indicating that the new authorities were of a “reliable type”. The 
public seemed quite prepared to support cuts in wasteful government expenditures, but was not 
keen on deep adjustments. Everybody seemed to be expecting good news about the economy, that 
is, signs that growth could restart.  
 
The government anticipated that the effects of productivity gains and improvements in international 
conditions would permit exports to increase again, which would be compatible with a moderate rise 
in GDP. The authorities identified the fiscal situation as the main immediate problem.
15 The most 
salient policy announcement made in the inauguration was a package that raised a variety of taxes, 
most noticeably the income tax. 
 
Financial markets reacted with calm to these announcements, although influential analysts criticized 
what they saw as insufficient emphasis on spending cuts. For the public, the tax increase seemed to 
represent the prelude of more difficult times, perhaps not only because of its direct impacts, but 
because it could indicate that the economic situation was “worse than expected”. Without yet losing 
confidence in the financial system (deposits increased, and the banks were active offering loans, on 
mortgage, particularly), it appeared that people were revising their income prospects downwards. In 
fact, domestic demand again declined in the first months of 2000, which affected tax revenues. The 
authorities reacted by announcing spending reductions, including cuts in the higher salaries in the 
national government. Private expectations seemed to grow more and more sensitive to short-run 
news, and policy responses influenced by the immediate “market mood” as indicated in the 
oscillations of country-risk interest spreads.   
 
                                                 
14 Support for convertibility remained very strong as the crisis developed. In January 2001, a poll (Graciela 
Römer & Asociados, 2001) found 67% positive responses (and only 12% negative) to the question: Should 
the government maintain convertibility?  
15 “The …public debt has increased to about 45.7% of GDP in 1999. Although this level is not particularly 
high in comparison with other emergent economies, the rapid rise in recent years is a cause of concern. Even 
more worrying was the perspective for 2000. Even accepting that nominal GDP would grow by about 5%, the 
budget deficit of the national government would exceed… 3% of GDP, a totally unacceptable value…”   
(Ministerio de Economía, Annual Report 1999, p. 7)  
  15As time went on without signs of recovery, future prospects were probably revised downwards, and 
plans modified consequently. With tax revenues that did not grow, the financing constraint for the 
government became tighter, and the pressures for additional fiscal retrenchment stronger. But, apart 
from their direct effect on aggregate spending, new measures of fiscal adjustment in such conditions 
could be interpreted pessimistically, with secondary effects on revenues. Aggregate demand (and 
the tax base) depended also on the availability of funds to finance the current account, and thus, on 
the anticipated performance of exports. In this regard, questions about the robustness of the 
convertibility system were increasingly posed and, especially in international circles, fixed 
exchange rates appeared to be regarded with much less favor than in the past  (particularly as 
analysts appeared to interpret the recent experience of Brazil as an indication that devaluation and 
later floating need not be too traumatic). 
 
At the same time, the political scene was showing increasing complications. In October 2000, the 
Vice-President resigned (criticizing the government for not doing enough about allegations that 
Senators had been offered bribes to vote a law reforming the labor legislation). That resignation, 
and its motives, clearly weakened the ruling coalition, especially when the lack of improvement of 
social and economic conditions was also eroding the support for the ongoing policies. This was an 
important shock to expectations. 
  
In the last part of the year, the country risk indices rose substantially, and the future rollover of the 
public debt appeared problematic. At this point, the government negotiated a package of loans 
(popularly known as “blindaje”) from the IMF and other IFIs. Clearly, the package implied a bet on 
a number of conditions: that the announcement of the agreement would produce a sufficient 
immediate effect on interest rates, that the economy showed signs of recovery without too large 
current account deficits, and that fiscal policies managed to generate a rising primary surplus, all in 
such a way that the problems that the economy was facing would turn out to have been transitory 
financing difficulties. Either agents could identify a concrete “recovery scenario”, or there would be 
deeper troubles ahead. Over time, the burden of the proof had shifted so that (in contrast with what 
was observed not so long ago) now the possibility that the Argentine economy “could still work” 
was the case to be argued under serious questioning. Indeed, there was no solid argument that a 
sustainable recovery would happen with high probability, especially when the movements in the 
currencies of major partners still went in the direction of appreciating the peso. However, it was 
also less than obvious that definitely “nothing could be done” (or “nothing could happen”) to avoid 
a major collapse and irreversible events like a default, a termination of convertibility, or a forced 
dollarization. Typical flexibility preference would motivate not precipitating those events. 
Uncertainty about the effects of major policy moves could also be a factor, as one proposal could 
act as a strong counterargument against others (see Heymann, 1990). But, above all, neither 
internally nor abroad there appeared to be a design for a complete plan that could address with some 
consistency the problems of dealing concretely with a prospect of external and/or fiscal insolvency. 
The lack of a specific “exit alternative” was a characteristic of the last months of convertibility. 
 
The announcement of the credit package eased financial conditions for a while in the first months of 
2001. However, real activity did not recover, and the fiscal performance deviated from the targets of 
the IMF program. After the resignation of Minister Machinea, a new economic team proposed a 
program of cuts in government spending, which included reductions in transfers to the provinces 
and to universities. The plan received support from the IMF and from business groups, but faced a 
sharp opposition from much of the political system (including cabinet members who resigned, and 
an important fraction of the government’s coalition), and was received with skepticism by the 
  16public.
16 The measures had unpopular contents and, while they were interpreted as indicating that 
the economic situation was very serious, that perception was probably not strong enough (and the 
improvements that the measures may generate not clear enough) to generate sufficient acceptance 
as “the only possible alternative”. Whether because of the political resistance to the fiscal 
adjustment, or because of negative expectations about the economy, country risk indices increased 
while the program was under discussion. Bank deposits dropped noticeably in March 2001: a 
particularly ominous sign, given that it created a new and strong factor of disturbance, from what 
had seemed until then a “strong point” in an otherwise much weakened economy. 
 
Eventually, the adjustment plan was abandoned, and Minister Lopez Murphy resigned after a short 
time in office. This brought back Domingo Cavallo, the original architect of convertibility. After 
obtaining emergency powers from Congress, the new economic authorities initiated very active 
fiscal and monetary/financial policies, with multiple objectives, and with the aim of rapidly 
inducing a recovery.
 The drain of bank deposits stopped for a while. However, tough dilemmas and 
difficulties emerged quite soon. 
 
The government generated a small depreciation of the currency for commercial transactions by 
pegging the exchange rate for those transactions to a dollar-euro basket (as a preliminary to the 
establishment of a “broadened convertibility”, which would come into effect for all purposes when 
the two international currencies reached parity with one another). This measure (and disagreements 
about the management of liquidity requirements of banks) caused a conflict with the president of 
the Central Bank (who had encouraged dollarization proposals), after which he was made to leave 
office. The episode induced a negative response in financial circles. Also, contrary to the hope of 
the authorities, the introduction of the dollar-euro basket was interpreted by the public as a signal of 
further moves to end convertibility. 
 
The financing of the government was increasingly complicated. With a restricted access to 
international markets, more debt was sold internally, mostly to banks and pension funds. The 
persistent increase in the country risk indices (to around 1200 points by late April) indicated both 
that bondholders were assigning a substantial probability to non-payment, and that the rollover of 
the debt was problematic. In the event, the government decided to perform a “mega-swap”, 
exchanging titles with shorter maturities for longer-term bonds. This was meant to push away the 
risks of a liquidity crisis, but the new issues validated interest rates around 15%, which posed a 
definite question about solvency.
17 The country-risk indices did not fall much, and increased 
explosively in July to over 1600 points. Meanwhile, bank deposits were again declining rapidly. At 
this point, pessimistic expectations had changed into a generalized attitude of running for cover 
(with due regard for the heterogeneity of reactions). Private capital flight was reaching very high 
proportions so that, even with a large use of multilateral financing, international reserves dropped 
considerably. Real activity was now falling precipitously, tax revenues were much lower than one 
year before, and the sources of market financing for the public sector were closed.   
 
The reaction of the authorities was to announce a “zero deficit” policy: now the stress was put 
singly on the cash management of the government so as to make monthly payments match monthly 
receipts. As part of this policy, Congress voted, after much debate, but in haste, a 13% cut in public 
salaries and pensions above 500 pesos (dollars at the time) per month. With a worsened economic 
                                                 
16 Two polls conducted by a newspaper (Clarín, March 16 and 17, 2001) gave the following results: What are 
your expectations about the economic program: Good (25.8%), Fair (16.8%), Bad (57.6%); Do you think that 
the adjustment will induce economic growth: Yes (30%), No (70%).    
17 Cf. the interpretation of Mussa (2002, p. 67):  “…an act of desperation of a debtor who can promise almost 
anything in the long run in exchange for a relatively modest short-run relief”.  
  17outlook, highly painful measures were taken; but in those conditions (and beyond the “political 
credibility” of the zero-deficit criterion) the incentives to spend and to lend in the country were 
much diminished. The authorities turned to the IMF for emergency assistance.  
 
By that time, the “Argentine D’s” (depression, devaluation, default, dollarization, measures on bank 
deposits…) were the subject of much public discussion (cf. e.g. Eichengreen (2001)). The 
Argentine government was urged to implement “sustainable” policies; the term was left undefined, 
although it seemed implicit that it probably encompassed devaluation and/or default on the public 
debt. However, those statements and opinions were far from specifying a precise policy design. The 
income the economy could generate had been found to be lower than expected and a large variety of 
contracts were based on expectations that now seemed very unlikely to be fulfilled. The problems 
reinforced one another (and had to be addressed simultaneously: “one at a time” would not do). The 
perspective of default on the public debt raised the “fundamental” fears of depositors (as banks had 
large holdings of bonds); the run on deposits put convertibility into imminent danger, devaluation 
would likely cause a collapse of the financial system and aggravate the debt problem of the 
government and of many firms, the perspective of such a catastrophe prolonged the vertical fall in 
real activity, so that government revenues were lower and lower….  
 
The economy was in a state where widespread bankruptcies seemed likely: finding a “least cost” 
response would have required an extraordinary capacity for policy design and an equally 
extraordinary degree of coordination and willingness to compromise of large sets of agents (lenders 
and borrowers, taxpayers, public sector workers and pensioners, privatized utilities, banks, business 
firms, government authorities of different jurisdictions, international institutions) many of which 
had strong feelings about their rights and about the wrongs of others. The solution appeared in fact 
to be beyond the grasp of economists of different persuasion (the present authors no doubt 
included), politicians and international agencies, and certainly far beyond the institutional and 
political capacities of the country. 
 
Finally, the IMF granted an emergency loan, although quite clearly with much reluctance. This did 
not generate much relief. It seemed as if the system was overdetermined, and the inconsistencies 
showed one after the other in rapid succession. The authorities announced their intention to 
restructure the public debt. While public spending was falling, the rapid drop in revenues led the 
government to use unorthodox financing means like the issues of  “emergency monies” by local 
jurisdictions. The supply of these instruments was another drop in the bucket of motives for the 
drain of deposits and the loss of reserves. Finally, faced with a frantic run, the government decided 
to apply restrictions on the withdrawal of deposits and to introduce exchange controls. This meant 
in fact suspending convertibility; after some weeks (and several Presidential changes), this was 
formally terminated. Convertibility was known to have big exit costs; indeed, they proved to be 
extremely high.   
 
6. Parting  Thoughts 
 
During the eighties, the instability of the Argentine economy was such that agents were unwilling to 
make commitments extending over more than a very short period of time. The set of financial 
instruments was very poor, and little investment was carried out without a subsidy of some sort. In 
those circumstances, the economy stagnated. The experience led to a general recognition of the 
costs that high inflation and the lack of a framework for contractual and investment decisions had 
inflicted on the economy. Convertibility tried to provide such a framework by restricting monetary 
policies and validating the widespread use of the dollar as a standard of denomination in domestic 
transactions. There was a generalized view that such measures were necessary to induce the 
  18emergence of credit markets, and this, in turn, would make it possible to take advantage of large 
growth possibilities left unexploited in an unfavorable macroeconomic environment. At the same 
time, a large set of economic reforms were implemented, broadly following what was at the time an 
international consensus about the policies which would foster growth.  
 
Convertibility was a central element of an attempt to change the trend of the economy. The 
monetary arrangement formed the basis for an elaborate system of contracts. The “contractual 
density” (which clearly signified a break with the past in an economy where, say, private mortgage 
loans had been a rarity for decades) enlarged the consumption and investment opportunities of big 
sets of agents, and contributed to the growth in economic activity. This generated expectations of 
further improvements in real income. At the same time, contracts were in fact (although not 
explicitly) contingent on the realization of a strong enough performance of the economy, that would 
sustain the expectations of dollar incomes at historically high levels. The seemingly unconditional 
promises were vulnerable to an overshooting of expectations or to external shocks that would make 
those incomes much lower than predicted, since they contained no escape clause that could be 
invoked in the occasion (Haussmann and Velasco (2002), Perry and Servén (2002)). The increasing 
volume of dollar-denominated contracts indicated the willingness of agents (private and public) to 
enter into agreements that in fact implied those risks, and simultaneously it operated as a lock-in 
effect for convertibility, by visibly increasing its exit costs. 
 
Over time, the government became more and more committed to the fixed exchange rate in several 
ways. Since alternative mechanisms for gaining policy credibility did not arise, strict adherence to 
the existing monetary rule remained identified with stability and predictability. By issuing large 
volumes of dollar-denominated bonds, the government made its solvency depend on maintaining 
the exchange rate. As regulators, the authorities had legally fixed utility prices in dollars, a 
provision that could hardly be enforced if the real exchange rate increased significantly. The private 
sector had accumulated large dollar debts and assets, and it was clear that an exit from the “one 
peso-one dollar” status quo would generate a disturbance of unpredictable (but certainly very 
strong) consequences. The set of promises seemed such that they either held together or broke 
together. In order to make them hold, the public sector had to be intertemporally solvent (and 
perceived as such until it was eventually able to reduce its debt). But this required “external 
balance” (i.e. meeting the economy’s aggregate budget constraint) at real exchange rates that would 
not disturb the repayment of debts. 
 
This condition ruled out devaluation and a sizeable (debt) deflation. Avoiding those outcomes was 
feasible only if the “equilibrium” exchange rate was not too far from the prevailing values. 
Accordingly, the trend growth of exports had to be high enough (and, again, perceived as high 
enough) to sustain aggregate domestic demand without running into a foreign financing constraint. 
Otherwise, if a considerable drop of aggregate spending was required, fiscal adjustment would run 
against a fall in revenues (in terms of the denominator of assets), and likely contribute to a 
deflationary spiral, which would become amplified through its financial effects. The fulfillment of 
contracts relied on the behavior of fiscal policies but, ultimately, it depended on whether 
international conditions and the actual strength of the effects of productivity and investment on the 
productive capacity of traded goods, were in correspondence with the evolution of the economy 
implicit in the expectations entertained by agents when they had decided to lend or to borrow. 
 
In the end, it appeared that the bet on rapid growth would not be successful; as income levels 
became unsustainable, large sets of debtors (noticeably the government) were seen as unable to 
service their obligations. There were probably ways to deal with the crisis with less traumatic 
outcomes than the ones observed. But it is difficult to see how these alternatives could have avoided 
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reputation costs.  
 
Eventually, the disappointment of expectations was of dramatic intensity. It led to poverty levels as 
the country had not previously known, to deep economic uncertainties in the midst of a big 
depression (where credit transactions almost altogether stopped and the legal status of 
reprogrammed/pessified bank deposits and loans was undefined after months of litigation) and the 
political system had been discredited. In these conditions, real activity plunged and the real 
exchange rate jumped in such a way that the (constant) dollar value of per capita GDP dropped to 
its lowest levels in decades. As a legacy of the years of price stability (and as a consequence of the 
depressed domestic spending), the demand for local currency for everyday transactions and its use 
as denominator of prices proved notably resilient, even while the nominal exchange rate multiplied 
by about four times. 
 
An outcome like the Argentine crisis certainly seems worthwhile to be prevented. “Buying 
insurance” against such collapse can be costly in terms of economic performance in “good” states 
of the world: in the particular Argentine case, it seems that the post-hyperinflation recovery would 
have been much weaker without the anchor provided by convertibility and the use of a dollar 
denominator for financial assets. In particular, a less strict monetary system without a definite link 
to the dollar would have likely implied much higher interest rates and lower investment. Trying to 
apply convertibility with “fiscal insurance” may have generated quite difficult policy problems, as 
the government would have been required to generate a buffer stock of resources while “leaning 
against the wind” (for instance through consumption taxes) if the increase in aggregate demand was 
seen to be rising “too fast”. However, the experience indicates how a system that makes little 
provision for unfavorable events can end up reversing the gains it may have obtained in the 
meantime. 
 
A possible conclusion is that, especially in an economy in transition, the risks to be contemplated 
include those derived from “model uncertainty”:
18 policies that follow what at the time is believed 
to be “good practice” are no guarantee of success. In the Argentine case, the combination of 
stabilization and reforms could have indeed resulted in high growth; but there was no firm 
knowledge to take that result as a foregone conclusion, and even less to allow a precise “point 
estimate” of the likely increase in income. Incorporating that type of uncertainty poses subtle, and 
tough, analytical questions (see Hansen and Sargent, 2001) and, in practice, it would ask for 
policymakers with sufficient time perspective and self-restraint to allow (more or less explicitly) for 
the fallibility of their “preferred” model. Policy-making in transitions cannot but have an important 
element of judgment (even in developed countries, the border between “well-founded optimism” 
and “irrational exuberance” can be difficult to identify at times). This is one important reason why 
policy flexibility remains especially valuable in those conditions, even after recognizing the tradeoff 
with addressing credibility problems. An economy where future conditions are quite uncertain and 
at the same time government discretion is very distrusted will have hard times establishing an 
appropriate framework for policy-making. However, “corner solutions” are unlikely to be the right 
responses. If the time discount is not too large, investment in reputation can substitute profitably for 
tight constraints (although, of course, all of this remains fundamentally parameter-dependent). A 
similar argument for “purchasing flexibility” would apply for fiscal policies: the ability to use 
                                                 
18 This is also true in developed countries. Blinder (2002) states that the main difficulty in conducting 
monetary policy which he encountered at the FED was model uncertainty: “In practice, of course, we do not 
know the model but must estimate it econometrically. Since economists agree neither on the “right” model 
nor on the “right” econometric techniques, this is a nontrivial problem”.  
  20resources countercyclically critically depends on the perceived solvency of the government when a 
shock hits. 
 
Those matters related with the management of uncertainty connect with one of the biggest issues 
posed by the Argentine experience: the correspondence between the features of contracts (including 
institutionally based policy promises) and the nature of contingencies the economy may be subject 
to. It is evident that a shock that can be handled by one set of contracts (through an explicit or 
implicit escape clause) can cause the collapse of others (and the Argentine case suggests that it may 
be difficult to expect low-friction massive renegotiations of contracts which have been disturbed). 
In the specific instance of Argentina, it was realized that the economy “could not really” maintain 
more or less steady incomes in dollar terms. Why agents would want to make contracts that are 
open to large shocks (and whether they recognize the risks associated with different types of 
contracts) is a matter that we are not prepared to discuss here. But, indeed, establishing a setting 
such that the agreements between parties will not be modified by “arbitrary” policy interventions 
and, at the same time, agents are not induced to take “unnecessary real risks” (possibly in trying to 
avoid those interventions) is a major policy problem. One of the big challenges that the Argentine 
economy (and its policymakers) will be facing is to gradually reconstitute a credit system in which 
“typical” macroeconomic contingencies (such as movements in the real exchange rate) do not cause 
the danger of a breakdown. The problem of contractual design appears also relevant for the 
renegotiation of the public debt of an economy where future prospects are subject to a great deal of 
uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 1: Macroeconomic Framework   
 
a)  Simple open-economy models: a brief reminder 
 
Consider a very simple model of a representative-agent, pure endowment economy producing 
tradeable goods (denoted T) and non-traded goods (N). The economy participates in an 
international credit market, where the interest rate is known to be constant and equal to the rate 
of time preference of the representative consumer of the economy. Instantaneous preferences 
over goods T and N are such that the consumer allocates the value of spending in constant 
proportions, γ and 1-γ, respectively (the parameter γ relates to the degree of “tradability” of the 
economy, defined as the share of sector T in total output). The value of consumption in terms of 
traded goods is the return on perceived wealth in terms of those goods. The primary spending of 
the government consists of non-traded goods. The conditions for Ricardian equivalence are 
assumed to hold.  
 
Let YTk, YNk represent the outputs of goods T, N in period k, CTk, CNk the volumes of consumption 
of those goods, GNk government spending in period k,  pNk the price of good N (with T as 
numéraire), A0 the financial assets held by the representative consumer at the start of period 0 
and B0 the public debt at the same moment. Then, private wealth is: 
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In equilibrium, the “non-tradeable component” of wealth is given endogenously by the 
decisions of the consumer, and therefore can be written as a function of wealth, since: 
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Then, a self-consistent estimate of wealth is therefore given by: 
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This implies that consumption of traded goods and the value of consumption of non-traded 
goods are proportional to the “traded goods component” of perceived wealth given by the level 
of net foreign assets and the present value of the flow of traded-goods output. In this very basic 
framework, some implications are: 
  
i)  The “sustainable” sequences of spending (defined as the paths of the demand for goods 
compatible with foresight) cannot be determined except with reference to the future 
evolution of output (and incomes). By itself, past information does not establish 
whether, say, a current account deficit is “too large” or “too small”, or whether the real 
exchange rate is misaligned. 
ii)  An anticipated increase in the future output of traded goods raises the consumption of 
traded goods (and reduces the trade balance) and the price of non-traded goods in 
  22proportion to the rise of traded-goods wealth, independently of the future evolution of 
the output of non-traded goods. 
iii)  Similarly, a transfer of traded goods increases aggregate demand in proportion to its 
effect on traded-goods; in particular, for given transfer/GDP values, the consequent real 
appreciation will be larger in a more “closed” (lower γ) economy (cf. Perry and Servén 
(2002)). 
iv)  An increase in traded-goods wealth, through its effect on equilibrium prices, drives 
upwards the government spending/GDP ratio. 
v)  A higher volume of public spending (in non-traded goods) implies, ceteris paribus, a 
real appreciation (as the supply of goods for private consumption diminishes while the 
value of private consumption does not vary), but has no effect on the consumption of 
traded goods and the trade balance. 
 
b)  Adjustment without credit constraints and with tax revenues proportional to GDP 
 
The exercise consists in studying the effects of a shock on the supply of traded goods (or, 
equivalently, a fall in the “dollar price” of traded goods), assuming that the government’s revenues 
are a proportion τ of the value of output (in this simple framework, the assumption does not modify 
the Ricardian proposition). The shift is an “unexpected” permanent decline in the output of traded 
goods; for simplicity, the levels of YT are considered to be constant over time before and after the 
shock. It is assumed that government spending adjusts once and for all to a new constant value 
consistent with the new intertemporal budget constraint. Credit conditions do not vary: access to 
financing remains unrestricted, and the interest rate does not change.  
Let  
γ
γ
γ
−
=
1
'  represent the ratio between the values of private consumption of traded goods and 
non-traded goods. It can be shown that, given that YN is fixed by hypothesis, the elasticity of the 
equilibrium price of non-tradeables with respect to the output of traded goods is: 
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Where k indicates the ratio between the values of output of traded and non-traded goods. The 
dependence of the volume of public spending on the value of output generates a “fiscal amplifier” 
of the shock. 
 
c)  Adjustment with constrained public and foreign debts  
 
The experiment is similar to the previous one, except that now the level of public debt is 
constrained as a proportion of the value of GDP, while the foreign debt must remain at most equal 
to a certain proportion of the output of traded goods.
19 The parameters that measure the constraints 
                                                 
19 The foreign debt constraint generates an endogenous “sudden stop” (Calvo et al. (2002)). The production of 
traded goods seems a straightforward indicator of the capacity to serve foreign debts. In the case of the 
government’s constraint, it may be preferable to represent it as a function of future expected values of GDP. 
The distinction is relevant, since there will be an overshooting in the value of aggregate spending as the levels 
of debt adjust to their constraints. However, the simpler construction used here serves the purposes of the 
exercise. 
  23are, respectively, β and α. It is assumed that before the shock, the constraints were already binding. 
Government spending and the consumption of traded goods are limited, respectively, by:
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After some manipulations, the elasticity of the equilibrium price of non-traded goods is obtained as: 
 
( )
() τ β
τ β γ α
γ − −
+ + +
=
1
) ( ' 1
' ˆ
ˆ
0 k
Y
P
T
N     (11) 
Clearly, the “multiplier” is now larger than in the previous case. If debt deflation effects were 
present, they would add to the impact of the shock.  
       
APPENDIX 2:  Risky Policy Behavior as a Device to Signal Growth Opportunities 
 
This very simplified example illustrates the possibility that a policymaker with private information 
about the possible paths of the economy may choose to take a riskier policy action than it would 
take in a non-signaling context, in order to reinforce the perception of good prospects and hence 
induce, say, more private investment. The model is a follows. 
 
There are two players, a policymaker G and one private sector agent A.  The timing is as follows: 
the government observes a private signal Pi, which refers to the probability that the future state of 
nature will be of “high productivity”. There are three possible signals, i=L,M,H  (to indicate low, 
medium and high probability of a good state). The government can then choose an action Y which 
can take three values, also denoted L, M, H. Finally, A makes an investment decision I, which can 
take values 0 or 1. The project succeeds in the good state, and fails in the bad state. 
 
Except for the signal, everything else in the game is common knowledge. The probability Pi 
indicated by the signal can take three values, low, medium or high, with PL<PM<PH.  If the signal 
was fully reliable, the posterior belief of G would equal the signal.  Let RG ∈(0,1) measure the 
reliability of the signal, as perceived by the government. In that case the government’s posterior 
belief after observing Pi equals RG*Pi+(1-RG)*P0, where P0 is the prior. In turn, 
P0=QL*PL+QM*PM+QH*PH, where Qi is the prior probability of observing the signal i. 
 
After G observes Pi, it takes a policy action. Policy action i constitutes what in a non-signaling 
world (i.e, when Pi is public information) would be the optimal policy.  We may assume, for 
example, that, if A believed that the probability of success of the project is PM he would invest, and 
the government’s action M, taken under the same belief, would incorporate an element of 
“insurance” against the chance of failure, given that the probability of a good outcome is not the 
highest. In the same vein, choosing PH would imply that the government acts “as if” it was not 
worthwhile to take that kind of precaution.  
                                                 
20 The exercise concentrates on the immediate impact of the shock (that is, in the period where spending 
adjusts to the change in the debt constraints).  
  24For brevity, we collapse the payoff of A into his equilibrium choice of whether to invest or not.  A 
will invest if and only if his posterior belief about the probability of success of the project is greater 
than a threshold PU. We assume that PM>PU>P0.  That is, A would undertake the project if he 
acted on the basis of the intermediate probability of success PM, but will not undertake it on the 
basis of his prior P0.
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The payoff of G is a function V(p,Y,I), where p is G’s posterior, Y is its action, and I is the action of 
the private sector. We assume that:  
 
V(RG*PM+(1-RG)*P0,H,1)>V(RG*PM+(1-RG)*P0,M,0)   (12) 
 
Implying that G prefers the investment project to be undertaken, even if it has to act too 
“aggressively” by taking policy action H, when in fact it has received the intermediate signal PM.
22 
 
For brevity, instead of fully analyzing the game, we just show the existence of one (Perfect 
Bayesian) equilibrium that delivers our desired result. In that equilibrium, the strategy of the 
government is to choose policy L after observing signal PL, and to choose policy H after observing 
either PM or PH. The private sector “responds” by not investing when it observes government 
policy L, and by investing when it observes H. 
 
Take first private sector choices. Given the strategy of the government, we have to construct A’s 
posterior by using Bayes rule, and see his optimal choice given that. Let RAε(0,1) be the reliability 
of the government’s signal, as perceived by the private agent. If observes L, his posterior is 
RA*L+(1-RA)*P0, which is clearly smaller that PU, so that I=0.  When A observes H, his posterior 
is (note that A recognizes that G has an incentive to signal H when observing M):  
 
RA*[PM*QM/(QM+QH)+PH*QH/(QM+QH )]+(1-RA)*P0    
 
Which for some values of parameters (for instance RA not too small) is greater than PU, inducing 
I=1. 
 
The private sector cannot use Bayes rule if it observed action M, since it is not an equilibrium 
action in the postulated equilibrium. (Yet, we need to analyze that node since we will need it when 
considering the optimality of G’s strategy). It is natural to impose assumptions on V such that Y=L 
is the dominant choice (with or without private sector investment) if the government observes PL. 
Then, if A observes action M, it will believe that (with probability one) G has observed PM. In that  
case, A’s “posterior” would become RA*PM+(1-RA)*P0.  For some values of RA this posterior 
would be smaller than PU, inducing I=0.   
 
For some values of the parameters QM, QH and RA, the two previous conditions can be satisfied, 
so that Y=M would induce I=0 and Y=H would induce I=1. We need that to be the best response of 
A, in order for G’s postulated strategy to be optimal. 
 
We look now into the policymaker’s choices, taking as given the strategy of A. From assumption 
(12), we have that G chooses H when it observes PM, if this is the only way to induce investment 
(and a fortiori when it observes PH). 
                                                 
21 A fortiori, the project is not undertaken on the basis of PL, and it is undertaken on the basis of PH, since 
PH> PM>PU>P0>PL. 
22 Note that [RG*PM+(1-RG)*P0] is the government’s posterior belief of the probability of success of the 
investment project, after receiving signal PM. 
  25In summary, we have shown that there is an equilibrium in which the government takes a 
suboptimal policy action which is “too bullish” (Y=H when observing PM), in order to promote 
private sector investment. The private sector does indeed respond with investment, while realizing 
that success is not guaranteed. 
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  28Figure 1: Phase diagram of per capita GDP at constant US$ dollars of 2000 (1970-2002) 
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  29Figure 2: Private Consumption at Constant Prices (1990 = 100)  
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  30Figure 3: National Public Sector Balance (% of GDP) 
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  31Figure 5: Public Sector Primary Expenditure at Current Prices (% of GDP) 
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  32Figure 6: National Public Sector Primary Expenditure and GDP at Constant Prices  
(1990 = 100) 
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  33Figure 7: Quarterly Exports (millions of dollars) 
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